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Abstract
Research on the mental representation of negated concepts in written texts has yet to
reach a consensus about the effects of negation. MacDonald and Just (1989) reported that
after reading a sentence with a negation, negated words took longer to recognize than
non-negated words, which suggests that the negated concepts became less active.
However, Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) found that after reading negative metaphors
(e.g., this surgeon isn’t a butcher), lexical decisions about words consistent with the
affirmative sense of the negated word (e.g., clumsy) took less time than for control words.
To reconcile these (and other) incompatible findings, two experiments were conducted to
test the possibility that the findings of MacDonald and Just do not persist beyond
immediate testing. Experiment 1 used a probe task and materials similar to those used by
MacDonald and Just, with the addition that the probe task occurred either 0 ms, 500 ms,
or 1000 ms after the end of the sentence. The negation effect was present at 0 ms,
replicating MacDonald and Just, but not at 500 ms or 1000 ms. This finding is consistent
with the hypothesis that the reduced activation seen from negation out of context is shortlived. Experiment 2 used an eye-tracking procedure to provide converging evidence for
the effect of additional processing time. However, the hypotheses were not supported.
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Reactivation of Negated Concepts over Time
Language is an indispensable part of what makes us human. Unlike animal
communication, which is rooted in non-symbolic signs, human language abstracts
thought into symbols that can be combined into an infinite number of utterances. This
allows us to communicate about abstract concepts as well as things that have never
occurred or could never occur. It frees us from discussing the immediate environment,
allowing us to communicate about the past and future just as easily as the present. Where
once people were bound by what they could discover in a single lifetime, language made
it possible for information to be transmitted across time, enabling people to benefit from
those who came before them.
For most of human history, language was exclusively spoken. But once writing
was invented, this important tool quickly spread across the world. With a modern
worldwide literacy rate around 82% (CIA Factbook, 2010), reading and writing are an
integral part of daily life for the majority of modern humans. And although language
comes naturally and with seemingly minimal effort, its usefulness is rivaled only by its
complexity.
Comprehension of a written text involves the construction of a mental
representation of the described state of affairs (van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan,
Radvansky, Hilliard, & Curiel, 1998). This mental representation includes information
previously presented in the text as well as general knowledge about the world.
Importantly, this representation is constantly evolving, with new information being
integrated either by adding to the representation if the new information is consistent, or
by altering the representation if the new information is inconsistent.
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It is fairly intuitive how information about the presence of some object or attribute
would be integrated into a mental representation; however, it is much less clear how the
mental representation would incorporate the absence of objects or attributes, as is the case
when a text contains negation either explicitly (e.g. not, never) or implicitly (e.g. forget,
ignore). In fact, there are several logical possibilities for how a negated concept is
included in the mental representation: (1) it is represented as if it were present, (2) it is
represented as if it were present and then suppressed, (3) it is never represented as if it
were present and is instead immediately suppressed, or (4) it is never represented.
Research on the processing of negation has produced inconsistent results regarding these
possibilities, and as such, no overarching theory of negation processing exists. What
follows is a review of some of these disparate findings.
Much of the research on the processing of negation suggests that when a word in
a sentence is negated, people are slower to recognize it after reading the sentence
compared to a sentence in which the same word is not negated (Kaup, 2001; Kaup &
Zwaan, 2003; MacDonald & Just, 1989). MacDonald and Just provided subjects with
sentences in which either the first direct object was negated (1 above), the second direct
object was negated (2), or there was no negation (3). They then used a probe recognition
(1) Almost every weekend, Elizabeth bakes no bread but only cookies.
(2) Almost every weekend, Elizabeth bakes some bread but no cookies.
(3) Almost every weekend, Elizabeth bakes some bread and some cookies.
task to measure the activation level of the representation of the negated and non-negated
direct objects. This task involved the subjects being presented with a word and indicating
whether or not it had occurred in the previous sentence. They found that subjects were
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slower to recognize the probe words if they had been negated than if they had not been
negated in the sentence. The increased time necessary to recognize a negated word is
consistent with the hypothesis that the negated concept had been suppressed in the mental
representation of the sentence. This would make it less active than a non-negated word
and therefore in need of more time for processing. However, based on these findings it is
unclear whether the negated concept is ever represented as present.
Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) also provided evidence that a suppression process
is occurring for negated concepts. Subjects saw affirmative (4) and negative metaphors
(5) and responded to a lexical decision task in which subjects had to decide whether letter
(4) The kindergarten is a zoo.
(5) The kindergarten is not a zoo.
strings were words or not. For critical trials, the strings were words related to the
meaning of either the affirmative metaphor (e.g. noisy) or negative metaphor (e.g. calm).
The lexical decision task was presented either 150, 500, or 1000 ms after the metaphor
was read. For the lexical decisions occurring 150 and 500 ms after the metaphor, the
affirmative meaning of the sentence was facilitated by both the affirmative and negative
metaphors, relative to an unrelated control metaphor. However, for the lexical decisions
occurring 1000 ms after the metaphor, the negated metaphors no longer facilitated
responding to the affirmative meaning. These results show that initially (150 and 500
ms), negated concepts are represented as if present. It is only after enough time has
passed for processing to occur (1000 ms) that the negated concepts show evidence of
suppression, consistent with the idea that negated concepts are represented as present and
then suppressed.
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While it may be true that under certain conditions negated entities are suppressed
in the reader’s mental representation, there is also evidence that under some conditions
negated entities continue to be represented as present over time and do not show signs of
suppression. Kaup (2001) presented subjects with sentences containing negation that used
either a verb of creation (6) or a verb of destruction (7). She found that subjects
(6) John does not build the church but the castle.
(7) Elizabeth does not burn the photographs but the letters.
responded slower to negated concepts than non-negated concepts on a probe task for
sentences containing verbs of creation, but when a sentence contained a verb of
destruction (e.g., burn), negation no longer reduced the accessibility of the negated
concept. Because the photographs were not destroyed, they should be represented as
present despite having been negated, as is appropriate for the assertion of the example
sentence in this case.
There is also evidence that negated entities are considered during anaphor
resolution (Levine & Hagaman, 2008). In this experiment, subjects read sentences like
(8) followed by (9). After reading a large number of passages like these and completing
(8) Joe bought a mango but not a pineapple.
(9) He ate the fruit in his kitchen.
a distracter task, subjects were given a surprise cued-recall task. Subjects were first asked
“You read about two kinds of fruit—what was one of them?” followed by “You read
about two kinds of fruit—what was the other?” Both negated and non-negated entities
were recalled at a higher rate than a baseline that did not have a sentence like (9), with no
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difference between the two. The fact that the negated concepts were just as active as the
non-negated concepts suggests that suppression did not occur.
These incompatible results highlight our incomplete knowledge of how negated
concepts are mentally represented. Both MacDonald and Just (1989) and Kaup (2001)
find evidence of early suppression of negated concepts when sentences contained verbs
of creation in which the negation signaled the absence of the concept. Hasson and
Glucksberg (2006) also found evidence of suppression, but not until 1000 ms after the
sentence. On the other hand, Kaup (2001) showed that suppression of negated concepts
does not occur when the sentences contained verbs of destruction, and Levine and
Hagaman (2008) showed that negated concepts continue to serve as possible antecedents
for anaphors. Thus it appears that negated entities can either be represented as present or
suppressed in the mental representation of the sentence, depending on specific features of
the negation (e.g., verbs of creation/destruction, metaphors, etc.). Therefore, two new
experiments were conducted to test an overarching explanation for these disparate
findings.
The present experiments were designed to investigate if the results of MacDonald
and Just (1989), which showed that negated concepts took longer to recognize than nonnegated concepts, can be explained by the fact that the negation in the sentences was
unlicensed, meaning that the preceding context provided no need for the negation. Take,
for example, the isolated sentence “Carol made a cake but not a pie.” The mention of pie
here is unnecessary here because the sentence “Carol made a cake” already licenses the
inference that she (probably) did not make pie, nor anything else other than cake. The
addition of “but not a pie” only becomes necessary if, prior to the sentence, there was the
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expectation that Carol would make a pie, in which case the preceding context would have
licensed the negation.
Unlicensed negation is difficult to process (Glenberg, Robertson, Jansen, &
Johnson-Glenberg, 1999) in part because it is a violation of Grice’s (1975) conversational
maxims. These four maxims, which are based on the assumption that all parties involved
in a conversation accept a common purpose or direction for the conversation, are as
follows: (1) The maxim of quantity—make your contributions to the conversation as
informative as necessary and do not make your contributions to the conversation more
informative than necessary; (2) the maxim of quality—do not say what you believe to be
false and do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence; (3) the maxim of
relevance—be relevant to the current topic of the conversation; and (4) the maxim of
manner— avoid obscurity of expression, avoid ambiguity, be brief, and be orderly.
Although Grice originally constructed these maxims to explain spoken language, it is
reasonable to assume that they also extend to written language because in some sense the
writer is “conversing” with the reader.
Unlicensed negation violates both the maxims of quantity and relevance because
it makes a sentence overly informative by adding irrelevant information. The violation of
a maxim leads the reader to generate an implicature, which is an explanation for why the
maxim was violated (Grice, 1975). A violation of one of the conversational maxims is not
always an error. For instance, metaphors (e.g. John has a big head) can be understood in
two ways: either (a) literally, meaning John’s head is large, or (b) figuratively, meaning
John has a large ego. When used figuratively, the size of John’s head appears irrelevant
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until one computes the implicature that the sentence was a metaphor. Importantly, this
implicature must be understood for the sentence to be comprehended properly.
Comprehending a sentence involves comparing the current sentence’s
presuppositions with information already in the mental representation, and testing for
consistency between the two. Every sentence presupposes some information and it is
easier to test for consistency between the presuppositions and the mental representation
when the presuppositions are explicitly stated. The sentence “Carol baked a cake but not
a pie” presupposes that there was some reason to believe she was going to bake a pie.
Presented out of context, this presupposition is never explicitly stated, which makes the
negation unlicensed. Because of this, the reader must construct a presupposition that
licenses the negation. Once a valid presupposition has been constructed, it then
retroactively licenses the mention, and negation, of pie.
It is this additional processing necessary for the construction of a presupposition
that may account for the divergent results of previous studies. But before discussing how
this processing may affect the activation of the negated concepts, it is necessary to take a
look at the timing of presuppositional processing.
The Given-New strategy (Haviland & Clark, 1974) was an early attempt to
explain how information is integrated into a mental representation of an evolving
discourse. This strategy proposes that people first identify the given information in a
sentence (i.e., what is presupposed) and compare it to the existing mental representation
of the preceding discourse, deciding whether or not they are consistent, and that only
after this will they alter the model to accommodate the new information (i.e., what is
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asserted). To test this hypothesis, Haviland and Clark had subjects read pairs of sentences
in which (10a) or (10b) provided context for (11). Sentence (11) made reference to the
(10a) We got some beer out of the trunk.
(10b) We checked some picnic supplies.
(11) The beer was warm.
direct object in the first sentence using a definite noun phrase (NP), which is usually a
marker of things that are presupposed. Half of the first sentences contained direct
antecedents like in (10a), such that the word “beer” occurred in both sentences, while the
other half contained indirect antecedents like in (10b), such that the word “beer” was
present only in the second sentence. Sentence (11), which presupposes the existence of
the beer, was read faster when the presupposition was explicitly provided in the first
sentence by the direct antecedent pair (10a) than when the presupposition was implicitly
provided in the indirect antecedent pair (10b).
This finding suggests that the need to infer a presupposition slows
comprehension; however, it does not explicitly test the temporal order of integration into
the representation. Because of this limitation, Haviland and Clark (1974) acknowledged
the inverse possibility for how information is integrated into a representation: the NewGiven strategy. This perspective assumes that readers initially take the truth of
presuppositions for granted and therefore focus first on the new information in the
sentence to comprehend what is asserted. After processing assertions, if they then have
the time and motivation, readers will compare presuppositions to the mental
representation.
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In support of this New-Given strategy, Hornby (1974) provided initial evidence
that presupposition processing occurs later than assertion processing. Subjects read
sentences like “The girl is petting the cat.” This particular sentence presupposes the
existence of both the girl and the cat and asserts the girl’s action of petting the cat. After
reading, subjects verified whether or not a presented picture matched the sentence. Of the
mismatched pictures, the inconsistency was sometimes with the sentence’s
presupposition, for instance showing a boy petting the cat, and sometimes with its
assertion, for instance showing the girl petting a dog. Subjects made more errors when
the pictures were inconsistent with the presupposition than when they were inconsistent
with the assertion. Accuracy in responding to the pictures should be a function of whether
the processing of the inconsistent component has been completed. Therefore, the moreaccurate responding to the assertion-inconsistent pictures suggests that assertion
processing was complete by the time the picture was presented, while the less-accurate
responding to the presupposition-inconsistent pictures suggests that presupposition
processing was not yet complete when the picture was presented. Because the pictures
were presented at the same time regardless of the type of inconsistency, these results
support the hypothesis that assertions are processed before presuppositions.
A more direct test of the New-Given strategy was provided by Langford and
Holmes (1979). In this study, subjects completed a paragraph-sentence verification task.
Subjects read one of two context paragraphs, for example about two roommates, Jane and
Mary, and then verified the truth of a target sentence, for example “It is Jane who wants
to get a television.” The target sentence was preceded by either (a) a false presupposition
context which described Jane wanting to buy a radio or (b) a false assertion context
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which described Mary wanting to buy a television. Following the false presupposition
context, the presupposition of the target sentence was inconsistent because Jane wanted a
radio not a television. Following the false assertion context, the assertion of the target
sentence was inconsistent because it was not Jane, but rather Mary who wanted the
television. Subjects were slower to verify the falsity of inconsistent presuppositions than
of inconsistent assertions. If presuppositions are processed first, as the Given-New
hypothesis proposes, subjects should have been faster to identify false presuppositions
than false assertions. Here, however, the results were similar to those of Hornby (1974),
with subjects showing more difficulty (i.e., slower verification times) processing false
presuppositions than false assertions, providing converging support for the New-Given
hypothesis.
The timing of presuppositional processing is an important component of the
hypotheses under investigation in the present experiments. Because the sentences
presented by MacDonald & Just (1989) were without context, the negation should trigger
a search for a relevant presupposition against which the negation can be comprehended
(Levine & Hagaman, 2008; Nieuwland & Kuperberg, 2008; Urbach & Kutas, 2010).
According to the New-Given strategy (cf. Hornby, 1974; Langford & Holmes, 1979),
prior to the completion of this presuppositional search, the reader will have finished
processing the assertion. This should lead to the negated concept being suppressed.
Measuring the activation of the negated concept at this point in time should produce the
pattern of results found by MacDonald and Just. However, the presuppositional search
should then draw attention back to the negated concept, activating the negated concept
such that it is no longer suppressed. It is therefore possible that the contradictory results
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of previous studies may be due to differences in the times at which the activation of the
negated concepts was being measured.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 used similar materials to those used in MacDonald and Just's (1989)
experiments, but also systematically varied the delay between the target noun and the
probe recognition task. Subjects read single sentences that contained unlicensed negation
of Noun 1 (12a) or Noun 2 (12b), or no negation (12c). Following each sentence, subjects
(12a) Every Friday Tina prepared not a lecture but only an activity …
(12b) Every Friday Tina prepared a lecture but not an activity ...
(12c) Every Friday Tina prepared a lecture and an activity ...
(13) Did Tina prepare a lecture?
completed a probe recognition task in which they verified whether or not a given word
was presented in the sentence. The probe words were either Noun 1 or Noun 2, and were
presented 0 ms, 500 ms, or 1000 ms after the end of the sentence, the latter being
manipulated between subjects. Additionally, subjects verified a comprehension statement
(like 13 above) to ensure they were fully reading and understanding the statements.
It was hypothesized that if presupposition processing is completed within 1000
ms 1 and if this processing reverses the suppression that occurs during assertion
processing, subjects should produce slower recognition times for negated concepts only
when the probe recognition task occurs before the completion of presuppositional
1

1000 ms was arbitrarily chosen as a delay that was long enough after MacDonald &
Just’s (1989) probe task that it should provide enough time for the additional
presupposition processing to at least begin.
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processing, creating a negation by delay interaction. On this basis, it is expected that in
the 0 ms delay condition, subjects will respond slower to probe words when they were
negated in the statement than when they were non-negated, replicating the findings of
MacDonald and Just (1989). The same should be true of the 500 ms delay condition when
presuppositional processing is still incomplete. However, in the 1000 ms condition, if
presuppositional processing has run to completion, negated entities should have sufficient
time to become reactivated, making them equally if not more active than the non-negated
entities.
Method
Subjects. One-hundred and sixty-eight students enrolled in a general psychology
course at the University of Arkansas participated in the experiment to partially fulfill a
research requirement. All subjects were native-English speakers. A subject's data were
excluded from analysis if (a) the subject's response accuracy to the probe words or
comprehension statements was less than 70% or (b) if the subject's mean reading time
was substantially (i.e., ±3 SDs) faster or slower than the overall mean reading time. These
criteria resulted in the exclusion of 17 subjects, leaving data from 151 subjects to be
included in the analyses.
Materials and Design. There were 42 experimental sentences which appeared in
one of three conditions (see Table 1). Each sentence presented a character by name
followed by a past-tense action verb and a compound direct object with two nouns that
were selected to be of similar length but not close semantic associates. Negation was
manipulated such that it occurred for the first direct object (Noun 1 Negated), the second
direct object (Noun 2 Negated), or neither direct object (No Negation). In addition, there
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were 58 filler sentences. About half of these filler sentences had syntactic structures
similar to the three experimental conditions, while the rest contained either two negated
direct objects, a single negated direct object, or a single non-negated direct object to help
mask the manipulation. In addition, each sentence had a corresponding comprehension
statement (e.g., Tina prepared a lecture), half of which required “yes” responses and half
of which required “no” responses.
Each subject saw each experimental sentence in one condition and all filler
sentences. Twelve lists of experimental sentences were created with the following
constraints: One-third of the experimental sentences in a list were of each condition
(Noun 1 Negated, Noun 2 Negated, and No Negation). Half of the nouns probed in each
condition were Noun 1, half were Noun 2. Across lists, each sentence appeared in each
condition one-third of the time, half the time with Noun 1 being probed, half the time
with Noun 2 being probed. The experimental trials never contained a false probe,
requiring the majority of the filler trials to contain false probes so that each recognition
answer occurred equally often. When the filler trials contained "yes" probes, they were
always nouns other than the direct object(s). Finally, a second set of experimental
materials were created that reversed the order of the nouns, such that Noun 1 was placed
in the Noun 2 position and Noun 2 was placed in the Noun 1 position. These
counterbalancing procedures were used within each of the three substantive betweensubjects conditions: the 0 ms delay, the 500 ms delay, and the 1000 ms delay. Thus, each
subject was presented with 100 total trials, with half of the probes and comprehension
statements requiring “yes” responses and the other half requiring “no” responses.
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Procedure. The experiment began with three practice blocks. In the first practice
block, subjects familiarized themselves with the response keys by pressing the left arrow
key on the keyboard (which was labeled “Y”) when the screen read “Yes” and the right
arrow key on the keyboard (which was labeled “N”) when the screen read “No.” They
completed ten of these yes-no trials and received feedback about the correctness of their
responses. In the second practice block, subjects practiced the probe-recognition task.
Each trial began with the words “Press the spacebar when ready” presented in the center
of the computer screen in all capital letters. When subjects pressed the spacebar, a
sentence was presented in the center of the computer screen. Subjects pressed the
spacebar to indicate when they had finished reading, which cleared the screen. After a set
delay (either 0 ms, 500 ms, or 1000 ms, depending on the condition the subject had been
assigned to), a single word appeared in the center of the screen in all capital letters.
Subjects indicated with the yes and no keys whether or not the presented word occurred
in the sentence. Again, subjects received feedback about the correctness of their
responses. In the third practice block, subjects practiced responding to the comprehension
statements. Again, sentences were presented in the center of the screen. When subjects
finished reading the sentence they pressed the spacebar which removed the sentence from
the screen and replaced it with a comprehension statement. Subjects then indicated with
the yes or no keys whether or not the comprehension statement was true. Feedback about
the correctness of their responses were again provided.
Subjects then began the experimental session. Each trial consisted of a sentence, a
probe word, and a comprehension statement. At the beginning of each trial, subjects were
given the instruction “PRESS THE SPACEBAR WHEN READY.” When they pressed
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the spacebar, the full experimental or filler sentence appeared centered on the screen and
remained until the subject pressed the spacebar a second time to indicate they had
finished reading. Following experimental sentences, subjects were presented with a probe
word that was either Noun 1 or Noun 2. Following filler sentences, the probe word was a
word from the sentence other than Noun 1 or Noun 2 or a false probe. The probes were
presented either 0 ms, 500 ms, or 1000ms (manipulated between subjects) after the
subject pressed the spacebar, and subjects indicated with a yes or no response whether the
probe word had occurred in the sentence by pressing the arrow keys labeled “Y” or “N.”
Reaction times for these responses were recorded. After the subjects respond to the probe
word, a comprehension statement appeared on the screen and subjects indicated with a
yes or no response whether or not the statement was true, again by pressing arrow keys
labeled “Y” or “N.” Feedback was no longer provided.
The experimental session consisted of 100 trials (42 experimental and 58 fillers)
in four blocks of 25 trials each. The order of the blocks, as well as the the order of the
trials within each block, were randomized with the restriction that the first statement of
each block was always a filler statement to allow time for the subjects to fully return their
attention to the task after the mandatory 10 s breaks between blocks. Subjects were
instructed to read the statements as they normally would for comprehension and to
respond to the probe words as quickly and accurately as possible. They were free to take
breaks between trials. The experiment lasted 30 to 45 minutes.
Results
Analysis. Because subjects and items are both random-effects variables, data
were analyzed twice, once with subjects treated as a random-effects variable (averaging

16

over items), for which F1 and t1 are reported, and once with items treated as a randomeffects variable (averaging over subjects), for which F2 and t2 are reported. Data analysis
was limited to probe responses that were (a) correct, (b) between 400 ms and 3000 ms,
and (c) less than 3 SDs away from each subject’s mean response time. All tests were
evaluated with an alpha level of .05.
All condition means appear in Table 2. A 3 (Delay) × 3 (Sentence) × 2 (Noun)
mixed-factor ANOVA, with the first factor being between-subjects and the second and
third factors being repeated measures, revealed a significant main effect of delay, F1(2,
148) = 5.17, p = .007,

= .07, F2(2, 166) = 71.56, p < .001,

= .46. A main effect

contrast for this factor showed that response times were significantly faster in the 500 ms
delay condition than the combined 0 and 1000 ms delay conditions, t1(148) = 3.19, p =
.002, d = 0.55, t2(83) = 11.58, p < .001, d = 1.37 2. Main effects were non-significant for
sentence, F1(2, 296) = 1.68, p = .20, F2(2, 166) = 1.23, p = .30, and noun, F1(1, 148) =
0.19, p = .66, F2(1, 83) = 0.24, p = .63.
The only significant two-way interaction was between sentence type and noun
(see Figure 1), with probe recognition times to the two concepts differing when one was
negated (Noun 1 Negated and Noun 2 Negated) but not when both concepts were present
(No Negation), F1(2, 296) = 12.60, p < .001,

= .08, F2(2, 332) = 10.59, p < .001,

=

.11. In the two negation conditions, probe recognition times were slower when the
concept was negated than when it was non-negated for both Noun 1 (Mnegated = 899, Mnonnegated
2

= 856), t1(150) = 3.33, p = .001, d = 0.27, t2(83) = 3.17, p = .002, d = 0.35, and

Effect sizes can be very different between the subject and item analyses because
missing data affects the two analyses differently.
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Noun 2 (Mnegated = 897, Mnon-negated = 869), t1(150) = 2.101, p = .04, d = 0.17, t2(83) =
2.040, p = .04, d = 0.22.
This result was qualified by a significant three-way interaction (see Table 2)
between sentence type, noun, and delay, F1(4, 296) = 3.92, p = .004,
= 3.73, p = .005,

= .05, F2(4, 332)

= .04. To further explore this interaction, paired-samples t-tests were

conducted to compare the recognition times for Noun 1 probes in the Noun 1 Negated
condition to the No Negation condition, separately for each delay. The same comparisons
were made between Noun 2 in the Noun 2 Negated condition and the No Negation
condition.
In the 0 ms delay condition (see Figure 2), probe recognition times were
significantly longer when Noun 1 was negated than when it was non-negated, t1(49) =
3.69, p = .001, d = 0.52, t2(83) = 3.06, p = .003, d = 0.33. This difference was significant
for Noun 2 in the subject analysis, t1(49) = 2.15, p = .04, d = 0.30, and nearly significant
in the item analysis, t2(83) = 1.67, p = .098, d = 0.18. In the 500 ms delay condition (see
Figure 3), Noun 1 probe recognition times were nearly significantly slower for negated
concepts than for non-negated concepts in the subject analysis, t1(49) = 1.92, p = .06, d =
0.27, and significantly slower in the item analysis, t2(83) = 2.20, p = .03, d = 0.24.This
difference, however, was non-significant for Noun 2 in both analyses, t1(49) = 1.15, p =
.25, t2 (83) = 1.38, p = .17. In the 1000 ms delay condition (see Figure 4), there were no
differences in probe recognition times for Noun 1, t1(50) = 0.72, p = .47, t2(83) = 0.47, p
= .64, or Noun 2, t1(50) = 0.62, p = .54, t2 (83) = 0.65, p = .52.
To get a clearer picture of how this effect changed over time, a negation effect
was computed for each noun at each delay condition (see Figure 5). The Noun 1 negation
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effect was computed by taking the difference between Noun 1 in the Noun 1 Negated
condition and Noun 1 in the No Negation condition, while the Noun 2 negation effect
was computed by taking the difference between Noun 2 in the Noun 2 Negated condition
and Noun 2 in the No Negation condition; that is, reaction times for a concept were
computed when the concept was negated and compared to when it was not negated.
Single-sample t-tests revealed a significant negation effect in the 0 ms delay condition for
Noun 1, t1(49) = 3.69, p = .001, d = 0.52, t2 (83) = 3.06 , p = .003, d = 0.33 , and for Noun
2 in the subject analysis, t1(49) = 2.15, p = .04, d = 0.30, but not the item analysis, t2(83)
=1.67 , p = .10, d = 0.18. In the 500 ms delay condition, there was a nearly significant
negation effect for Noun 1 in the subject analysis, t1(49) = 1.92, p = .06, d = 0.27, which
was significant in the item analysis, t2(83) = 2.20, p = .03, d = 0.24, but the negation
effect was non-significant for Noun 2 in both analyses, t1(49) = 1.15, p = .25, t2(83) =
1.38, p = .17. And in the 1000 ms delay condition, the negation effect was non-significant
for Noun 1, t (50) = 0.72, p = .47, t2(83) = 0.47, p = .64, and Noun 2, t1(50) = 0.62, p =
.54, t2 (83) = 0.65, p = .52.
Discussion
The results supported the hypothesis that the effect of negation changes over time.
When there was no delay (0 ms) between sentence and probe recognition task, concepts
were responded to slower when they had been negated than when they had been nonnegated, replicating the findings of MacDonald and Just (1989). However, with a 500 ms
delay the results were mixed, with a significant difference found for Noun 1, but not for
Noun 2. With a 1000 ms delay, there were no significant differences between negated and
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non-negated concepts for either Noun 1 or Noun 2. Thus, it appears that the negation
effect diminishes over time.
An explanation for this effect is that the initial assertional processing of the
negated concepts leads to suppression by the end of the sentence, as seen in the shortest
(0 ms) delay condition. But the additional time in the 500 and 100 ms delay conditions
gives subjects a chance to begin processing or possibly completely process the
presupposition that makes the unlicensed negation relevant. This processing involving the
negated noun causes it to be re-activated such that it counteracts the initial suppression
and the negation effect is no longer present. For example, consider the sentence “Tina
prepared not a lecture but only an activity for her students.” The assertion of this sentence
is that Tina prepared an activity and not a lecture. Thus, when the reader processes this
assertion, the concept of activity increases in activation and, conversely, the concept of
lecture is suppressed. But when the reader then processes the missing presupposition to
make sense of the unlicensed negation, the concept of lecture is re-activated such that it is
no less active than when lecture is non-negated.
If it is true that the resurgence of activation when negation is unlicensed is the
result of presuppositional processing, these findings also provide a rudimentary timeline
for the process. Because the negation effect is present with a 0 ms delay, but reduced and
non-significant with a 500 ms delay, it appears that presuppositional processing has
begun somewhere within this timeframe. And because the magnitude of the difference
between negated and non-negated concepts continued to decrease from the 500 ms delay
to the 1000 ms delay, it seems that some amount of processing continues beyond 500 ms.
However, it is unclear whether presuppositional processing is complete within 1000 ms
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or if it is still ongoing. If it is ongoing, it is possible that the continued processing would
further activate the negated concept, possibly leading to a level of activation significantly
higher than the non-negated concept, as predicted by the pragmatic-inference hypothesis
(Levine & Hagaman, 2008).
The probe recognition task may not be suitable for measuring this effect at longer
delays because the screen remains blank during the delay. In fact, the analysis of probe
recognition times for each delay suggests there may be some concerns even with a delay
of 1000 ms. Subjects responded significantly faster in the 500 ms delay than in the 0 ms
delay, as would be expected since the noun is increasing in activation. Therefore, it
would be expected that responses would be equally fast if not faster in the 1000 ms delay
since the ongoing processing should push activation even higher. But responses in the
1000 ms delay were actually roughly equivalent in speed to those at the 0 ms delay,
significantly slower than the 500 ms delay, not faster. Since the negation effect continued
to diminish in the 1000 ms delay, the slower responses may be taken as evidence that
subjects’ attention may have drifted from the task. Another task, then, is necessary to
evaluate this re-activation on a longer time scale.
A final point of discussion is the use of the No Negation condition as a baseline.
To assess the impact of negation, response times for the negated concepts in the Noun 1
Negated and Noun 2 Negated conditions were compared to the concept in the same
position in the No Negation condition. This baseline was chosen because it was used by
MacDonald and Just (1989). But instead of comparing Noun 1 in the Noun 1 Negated
condition to Noun 1 in the No Negation condition, it could also be compared to Noun 1 in
the Noun 2 Negated condition. This would provide a less-confounded comparison
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because the concepts would both be in sentences containing negation, while still
occurring in the same position in the sentence. This alternative baseline was tested, but
the results were not substantially different than the original baseline, and therefore are not
reported.
Experiment 2
Despite their heavy usage in the psycholinguistics literature, probe-word tasks
may not be the best method of measuring activation. Gordon, Hendrick, and Foster
(2000) found evidence that when subjects expect to engage in a probe-word task, they
create a “probe-list memory” such that they treat the text like an unrelated list of words to
be remembered rather than a cohesive whole. With this probe-list memory in place,
subjects then simply check probe words against this probe-list representation to respond
to probe words. To the extent that this occurs in probe-word tasks, the results may not
reflect comprehension processes, but instead may reflect memory strategies that are
unrelated to comprehension.
Thus, to find converging evidence for the results of Experiment 1 using a task that
would not induce a special strategy, Experiment 2 assessed the activation levels of
negated and non-negated concepts using an eye-tracker to record eye-movements as
subjects read sentences containing anaphors, which are expressions, like pronouns, that
refer to previously-mentioned concepts. Subjects read sentence pairs that included both a
singular and a plural direct object. The negation sentence manipulated the position of the
singular object and whether or not it was negated (14a-d) and was always followed by the
same reference sentence which contained an anaphor referring to the singular noun (15).
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(14a) Penny did bake a cake but did not bake brownies for dessert.
(14b) Penny did not bake a cake but did bake brownies for dessert.
(14c) Penny did not bake brownies but did bake a cake for dessert.
(14d) Penny did bake brownies but did not bake a cake for dessert.
(15) She had a mix for one in her pantry ...
These manipulations created four conditions such that differences between negated and
non-negated concepts could be compared both when they are relatively far away from
(Position 1) and relatively close to (Position 2) the anaphor in the reference sentence.
Several eye-tracking measures were analyzed for the critical regions around the anaphor
in the reference sentence to assess the activation level of the concept to which the
anaphor was referring. Presumably, the less active the concept of the antecedent is, the
more difficulty a subject will have processing the anaphor, as reflected in various
measures indicting reading difficulty. This method is more naturalistic than using a probe
word task since it more closely mirrors normal reading by having the subjects continue
reading instead of switching attention to the probe task.
It was hypothesized that subjects would show signs of processing difficulty on the
anaphor (i.e., longer reading times, more regressive eye-movements) when the negated
concept to which it refers was in Position 2 compared to when it was in Position 1. The
additional time that passes between the negated noun and the anaphor when the noun is in
Position 1 compared to when it is in Position 2 should give subjects the opportunity to
complete the presuppositional processing necessary to make sense of the unlicensed
negation. As in Experiment 1, the presuppositional processing should increase activation
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of the negated concept, which should in turn make it easier for subjects to process the
anaphor.
Method
Subjects. Sixty students from the same population as those who participated in
Experiment 1 participated in Experiment 2. All subjects were native-English speakers
with normal or to corrected-to-normal vision. Data from nine subjects were excluded
from the analysis because the subjects correctly responded to less than 60% of the
comprehension statements, and an additional two subjects' data were removed for having
unusable eye-tracking data 3.
Materials. Subjects read 32 experimental sentence-pairs (see Table 3). The first
sentence, referred to as the negation sentence, contained two verb phrases, one with a
singular direct object and the other with a plural direct object. The noun of interest was
the singular direct object. Four versions of the first sentence were created by
manipulating the position of the singular direct object (Position 1 or Position 2) and
whether it was non-negated or negated (Present or Negated). The negation sentence was
followed by a reference sentence that contained a singular pronoun (e.g.. it or one) that
unambiguously referred to the singular direct object. The distance between the antecedent
and anaphor when the antecedent was in Position 1 ranged from 8 to 14 words (M =
10.59, SD = 1.34). When the antecedent was in Position 2, the distance ranged from 4 to
7 words (M = 5.31, SD = 0.92). The reference sentence appeared in one of two versions,
depending on whether the singular direct object was non-negated (affirmative reference)
3

Several factors make subjects’ eyes more difficult to track, such as thick glasses frames,
excessive eye makeup, dark eyelashes, lazy eyes, etc.
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or negated (negative reference). These two conditions were identical through the first
clause, where the anaphor reading times were measured. They differed only in the second
clause, which made the statement fit the given scenario, but this occurred after the
regions on which analyses were performed; thus, this difference should not affect
subjects’ processing within the critical regions. The sentence-pairs appeared together on
one or two lines, depending on their length, but both the antecedent and the anaphor
critical region always occurred on the first line. Each sentence-pair was followed by a
comprehension statement which subjects verified as true or false using predefined keys
on a game controller to ensure subjects were reading for comprehension. In addition to
the experimental sentence-pairs, subjects read 58 filler statement pairs which were
syntactically similar to the experimental materials but designed to obscure the
experimental manipulation; the fillers were also followed by true-false comprehension
statements.
Because the materials were relatively complex and potentially difficult to
comprehend, a pilot study was conducted to ensure that subjects were able to correctly
identify the antecedent of the anaphor. Ten graduate students from the University of
Arkansas were presented the experimental sentence-pairs on a computer screen. Subjects
read each sentence-pair and pressed the spacebar to indicate they had finished reading it.
The sentence was then removed from the screen and subjects indicated to which of the
two direct objects the anaphor was referring. Subjects accurately identified the antecedent
at least 70% of the time for all materials.
Apparatus. Eye-movements were was recorded using an EyeLink 1000 desktopmounted eye tracker manufactured by SR Research (Mississauga, Ontario, Canada).
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Sampling frequency was 1000 Hz; only the right eye was tracked. The stimuli were
presented on a 20" CRT monitor with a screen resolution of 1024 x 768 and a refresh rate
of 85 Hz.
Procedure. Prior to the start of the experiment, subjects were calibrated on the
EyeLink 1000 using a 9-point display. Calibration was repeated until tracking error was
less than 0.5° of visual arc on average and the maximum error was less than 1°. Subjects
were then given instructions about how to interact with the computer using a game
controller with different buttons assigned for each response.
Each trial consisted of a sentence-pair to read and a comprehension statement. At
the beginning of each trial, a fixation point appeared on the left side of the screen to
indicate the location of the first word of the sentence-pair. While fixating on this point,
subjects pressed an assigned button to begin the trial and the negation and reference
sentence or filler sentence-pair appeared left-justified at that point of the screen. When
finished reading the sentence-pair, subjects pressed an assigned button and the sentences
were replaced by a comprehension statement. Subjects indicated whether the
comprehension statement was true or false by pressing assigned buttons. The fixation
point then reappeared and subjects were free to begin the next trial when ready. Trials
were divided into four blocks of 20 trials each, with short breaks in between. Subjects
were recalibrated following breaks if necessary, and at any point during the experiment
when the subject removed his or her head from the eye-tracker's chin rest, or if the
experimenter noticed a calibration problem. An experimenter was present in the room
throughout the experimental session.
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Results
Analysis. Two regions of the second sentence of each sentence pair were
analyzed. The critical region was defined as the word before the anaphor plus the anaphor
itself. Because the anaphors were only two or three letters long (i.e., it, one), it is possible
that it was being read while the subjects were fixating on the previous word (Underwood
& McConkie, 1985). The postcritical region was defined as the two words following the
anaphor. This region was analyzed to examine any continuing processing of the anaphor,
because the processing of a region continues even after the eyes have moved on in the
text (Rayner, 1998).
For each item, the regions of analysis were identical across conditions. Fixations
less than 80 ms and within 1° of visual angle from the previous fixation were merged
with the previous fixation. All other fixations less than 80 ms or greater than 1000 ms
(1500 ms for the regression-path duration analysis) were removed. Additionally, the
analyses only included trials in which subjects fixated in the region under analysis. All
tests were evaluated with an alpha level of .05.
Eye movement measures. Four eye movement measures were assessed for each
region of interest: (1) total reading time is the sum of all fixations within a region, which
is a measure of overall comprehension difficulty for the region; (2) gaze duration is the
sum of all fixations in a region until the point of fixation moves out of the region either to
the left or right, which is a measure of the initial processing of the region; (3) regressionpath duration is the sum of all fixations from the time that the region is first entered from
the left until it is first exited to the right, which is a measure of early processing
difficulty; and (4) first-pass regression ratio is the proportion of trials in which a
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regressive eye movement is made out of the region, which is another measure of early
processing difficulty. Table 4 displays means and standard deviations for all measures as
a function of condition and region of interest.
Critical Region. Analysis of the critical region provided weak evidence that
subjects had less difficulty processing the anaphor when the antecedent was in Position 2,
and stronger evidence that subjects had less difficulty processing the anaphor when the
antecedent was negated than when it was non-negated. A 2 (Negation) × 2 (Position)
repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted for each eye movement measure.
Analysis of total durations revealed a nearly significant main effect of position in
the subject analysis, with reading times on the critical region being shorter when the
antecedent of the anaphor was in Position 2 than when it was in Position 1, F1(1, 47) =
3.02, p = .09,

= .06 (see Figure 6), but this effect was non-significant in the item

analysis, F2(1, 27) = 1.19, p = .29. Analysis of regression path duration also revealed a
marginally significant main effect of position in the same direction in the subject
analysis, F1(1, 47) = 2.88, p = .096,

= .06 (see Figure 7), but this effect was non-

significant in the item analysis, F2(1, 27) = .046, p = .83. Analysis of first pass
regression ratios revealed a significant main effect of negation in the item analysis, with
subjects regressing out of the critical region more often when the antecedent of the
anaphor was non-negated than when it was negated, F2(1, 27) = 5.32, p = .03,

= .17

(see Figure 8), but this effect was non-significant in the subject analysis, F1(1, 47) = .20,
p = .66. Analysis of gaze durations revealed no significant effects (Fs < 1). There were no
significant interactions for any of the eye movement measures.
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Postcritical Region. Analysis of the postcritical region again provided evidence
that subjects had less difficulty processing the anaphor when the antecedent was negated
than when it was non-negated. A 2 (Negation) × 2 (Position) repeated-measures ANOVA
was conducted for each eye movement measure. Condition-by-region means for each
measure are reported in Table 4.
Analysis of first pass regression ratios revealed a significant main effect of
negation in the subject analysis, with subjects regressing out of the postcritical region
more often when the antecedent of the anaphor was non-negated than when it was
negated F1(1, 47) = 4.62, p = .037,

= .09 (see Figure 9), but this effect was non-

significant in the item analysis, F2(1, 27) = 0.23, p = .64. Analysis of gaze durations, total
durations, and regression path durations revealed no significant effects (Fs < 1). There
were no significant interactions for any of the eye movement measures in the post critical
region.
Discussion
The hypothesis that processing negated nouns would be more difficult when the
they were in Position 2 than when they were in Position 1 was not supported. Although
the predicted interaction between negation and position did not occur, several main
effects emerged.
The nearly significant main effect of position for both total duration and
regression path duration measures in the subject analysis of the critical region revealed
that subjects read the critical region faster and referred back to the previous text less often
when the antecedent was in Position 2 than when it was in Position 1. This effect is likely
the result of the recency effect (O’Brien, Plewes, & Albrecht, 1990), given that the nouns
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in Position 2 were more recently mentioned than nouns in Position 1 and the effect was
relatively weak.
Of more theoretical importance, the main effect of negation for first pass
regression ratios in the item analysis of the critical region and the subject analysis of the
postcritical region revealed that subjects regressed out of the region of analysis less often
when the antecedent was negated than when it was non-negated. This indicates that the
subjects had less difficulty processing the anaphor when the antecedent had been negated,
which suggests that the negated concepts had a higher level of activation than nonnegated concepts. It is generally accepted that negated concepts are less active than nonnegated concepts, so this result is relatively unsupported by the literature, but fits well
with the results of Experiment 1, with negated concepts in unlicensed contexts being no
less active than non-negated concepts after a short amount of time has passed. However,
these results should be interpreted with some reservation, since none of the effects were
present in both the subject and item analyses. This limits the interpretation of the results
to the specific subjects in the subject analyses or to the specific materials in the item
analyses.
General Discussion
Experiment 1 supported the hypothesis that negated concepts are less active than
non-negated concepts immediately after a sentence, but that this difference is no longer
present when subjects are given additional processing time. The favored explanation is
that the negated concepts are suppressed by assertion processing and then re-activated by
presupposition processing. However, it is also possible that the suppression fades over
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time regardless of presupposition processing, an explanation that is impossible to rule out
with the current data.
Experiment 2 did not find support for the predicted interaction between negation
and position. It was hypothesized that subjects would have more difficulty reading the
regions of interest when the negated antecedent was in Position 2 than when it was in
Position 1 because there would have been less time for the presupposition processing to
occur. However, the results suggest just the opposite, that subjects actually had somewhat
less difficulty when the negated antecedents were in Position 2 compared to Position 1.
There are several possible reasons why the hypothesized interaction between
negation and position did not occur in Experiment 2. First, the materials may not have
created the desired effect of allowing enough time for presuppositional processing to be
completed for the nouns in Position 1 but not for nouns in Position 2. The two
alternatives are that (1) presuppositional processing was completed for both nouns or (2)
that presuppositional processing was not completed for either noun. The first alternative
seems more likely, since the negated concepts appeared to be more active than nonnegated concepts, suggesting that the presuppositional processing had already occurred.
It may also be that presuppositional processing only needs to begin in order for
the negated concepts to increase in activation, rather than being fully completed. In this
case, both positions would allow sufficient time for presupposition processing to begin
and thus increase the activation of the negated concept. However, the results of
Experiment 1 suggest that negated concepts continue to increase in activation over time,
at least up to a full second. Taken together, the results from both experiments suggests
that activation may initially increase when presuppositional processing begins and then

31

continue to increase as the processing continues. It is unclear from either experiment
whether presuppositional processing is complete at the time when activation is measured
via a probe word or anaphor reading time.
A third possible explanation is that the difference in distance between the noun
and the anaphor for Position 1 and Position 2 was not distinct enough. The distance
varied across the materials, with as few as eight words between the Position 1 noun and
the anaphor and as many as seven words between the Position 2 noun and the anaphor.
Further differentiating the distance between conditions could have led to a greater
difference between the conditions.
A fourth possibility is that processing of the presupposition is delayed until the
end of the sentence. This would explain why significant results were found in Experiment
1 where the distance manipulation started after the sentence ended, but not in Experiment
2 where the distance manipulation started before the end of the sentence. This
explanation fits well with a “wait and see” theory of language processing (Bouma &
deVoogd, 1974), which argues that processing is delayed until a sufficient amount of
information is acquired to fully comprehend it. However, theories of incremental
processing, which argue that words are processed immediately upon encountering them,
have much more empirical support (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1980). Therefore, this is an
unlikely explanation for the lack of results.
The final potential explanation to be discussed here is that presuppositional
processing may not have any effect on the activation level of either negated or nonnegated concepts. However, there does appear to be something occurring when subjects
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are given additional processing time, but whether or not this effect is caused by
presupposition processing cannot be determined by the present experiments.
Although the hypothesized interaction did not occur in Experiment 2, the main
effect of negation is an important result. Unlike Experiment 1, in which negated and nonnegated concepts were found to be at roughly equal activation levels, Experiment 2's
results provided evidence for a higher level of activation for negated concepts than for
non-negated concepts as predicted by the pragmatic-inference hypothesis (Levine &
Hagaman, 2008). Therefore, both experiments suggest that the activation level of negated
concepts increases to a level equal to or possibly greater than non-negated concepts if
subjects are given sufficient time between the presentation of the concept and a
subsequent probe task or anaphor.
The effect of presupposition processing on the activation level of negated
concepts in unlicensed contexts may help explain the discrepancies within the literature.
This presupposition processing model proposes that two factors, time and whether the
negation was licensed or unlicensed, should interact such that additional processing time
will increase the activation of negated concepts only when the negation is unlicensed.
The existing literature fits well within this framework.
Several previous studies that have found negated concepts to be less active than
non-negated concepts presented subjects sentences with licensed negation. The target
sentences in Kaup (2001) were preceded by context passages several lines long which
provided details that licensed the negation. These contexts set up the idea that the
passage’s protagonist was choosing between alternatives, as in (16), which licenses the
negation that occurs in (17).
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(16) John is reading the [Lego] booklet and is wondering what he could build
next.
(17) After a while, he decides to build the castle but not the church.
By introducing a decision between multiple alternatives, the addition of “but not the
church” becomes relevant. Thus, it should be expected that negated concepts would be
less active than non-negated concepts. This is indeed what was found, even with the
probes being presented 2500 ms after the target sentence.
Kaup and Zwaan (2003) also preceded their target sentences with context
passages, and again the negation was licensed. However, the negation was not licensed
because of the context, but rather because the negation was about the assertion of the
sentences. Take, for example, the target sentence “Susan thought that they would buy the
bike, and she only wished the bike didn’t have a blue frame.” This sentence asserts that
the bike is blue. The negation is involved in this assertion, rather than a presupposition. It
is not necessary for the subjects to already have a representation of the bike being a color
other than blue for the sentence to be comprehended, therefore no presupposition search
is required to comprehend the negation. It should again be expected that negated concepts
would show less activation than non-negated concepts, since no presupposition search
will occur to reactivate the negated concept. With probes presented 500 ms after the
target sentence, this is precisely what was found.
The negation in the sentences presented by Hasson and Glucksberg (2006) was
also licensed because it was related to the sentence’s assertion. For example, consider the
sentence “The kindergarten is not a zoo.” This sentence asserts that the kindergarten was
a calm place. Again, it is not necessary for the subjects to already have a representation of
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the kindergarten being a noisy place. As expected following licensed negation, negated
concepts were found to be less active than non-negated concepts at 1000 ms after the
target sentence.
Thus, it appears that when negation is licensed, either by preceding context or by
virtue of being part of the sentence’s assertion, negated concepts are less active than nonnegated concepts. This finding is consistent across time, having been found at 500, 1000,
and 2500 ms, suggesting that additional processing time does not have an effect on
licensed negation.
Conversely, when negation is unlicensed, the relative levels of activation between
negated and non-negated concepts varies as a function of time. MacDonald and Just
(1989) presented subjects with single sentences like “Elizabeth baked some bread but no
cookies.” Unlike the previous cases where the negation was part of the sentence’s
assertion, in this case it seems to be part of a missing presupposition. The assertion here
is that Elizabeth baked bread. The function of “but no cookies” is not to add new
information, but rather to disconfirm a prior expectation. Unless there was reason to
expect that Elizabeth would bake cookies, there is an infinite number of other items that
could have been included, since Elizabeth also did not bake a cake, a pie, a telephone,
etc. Because the mention of cookies seems irrelevant to the reader, the negation is
unlicensed, and they must create the missing presupposition themselves.
Presenting the probe task at 0 ms, MacDonald and Just (1989) found evidence of
negated concepts being less active than non-negated concepts. Experiment 1 of the
present paper, which used materials modeled after MacDonald and Just, replicated this
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result at 0 ms, but found no such difference when the probe task was presented at 500 ms
or 1000 ms.
Levine and Hagaman (2008) and Experiment 2 of the present paper both
measured reading times on anaphors following sentences with unlicensed negation
similar to the previous example. Based on the number of words between the end of the
target sentence and the anaphor, subjects first read the anaphor about 1500-2000 ms after
the target sentence in both experiments. Levine and Hagaman found no difference in the
activation levels of negated and non-negated concepts and Experiment 2 found some
evidence that negated concepts might actually become more highly activated than nonnegated concepts. Thus, it appears that after reading unlicensed negation, the activation
level of negated concepts is initially lower than non-negated concepts and gradually
increases over time, possibly even to a higher level than non-negated concepts.
Although a comparison of licensed and unlicensed negation in the existing
literature supports the presupposition processing model, future research examining the
reduction of the negation effect over time in both licensed and unlicensed contexts will be
necessary to determine if the increase in activation is indeed the result of presuppositional
processing or if, instead, it is a gradual decrease in suppression of the negated concept
over time. Future research should also utilize methodologies other than probe tasks, such
as anaphor reading times, to allow the investigation of the level of activation of negated
concepts at longer delays than 1000 ms, to find the point at which additional processing
time no longer leads to increases in activation, which would be indicative of the
completion of presuppositional processing.
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Table 1

PROBES: lecture, activity

Noun1 Negated: Every Friday Tina prepared not a lecture but
only an activity for her students.
Noun2 Negated: Every Friday Tina prepared a lecture but not
an activity for her students
No Negation: Every Friday Tina prepared a lecture and an
activity for her students.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 1
0ms

500 ms

1000 ms

M (SE)

M (SE)

M (SE)

Present

891 (21.6)

786 (19.0)

891 (30.3)

Negated

964 (24.4)

822 (21.4)

911 (31.7)

Present

904 (24.4)

806 (19.7)

898 (30.1)

Negated

944 (20.4)

833 (25.1)

913 (30.3)

Noun 1

Noun 2
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Table 3
Position 1 Present (Affirmative Reference)
Penny did bake a cake but did not bake brownies for dessert. She had a mix for one in
her pantry, and had been planning to make it all week.
Position 1 Negated (Negative Reference)
Penny did not bake a cake but did bake brownies for desert. She had a mix for one in her
pantry, but was not in the mood for one.
Position 2 Present (Affirmative Reference)
Penny did not bake brownies but did bake a cake for dessert. She had a mix for one in
her pantry, and had been planning to make it all week.
Position 2 Negated (Negative Reference)
Penny did bake brownies but did not bake a cake for dessert. She had a mix for one in
her pantry, but was not in the mood for one.
Comprehension Statement:
Penny had a cake mix.

YES
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics for Experiment 2
Negated

Non-Negated

Position 1

Position 2

Position 1

Position 2

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

Region

Measure

Critical

Gaze Duration (ms)

363 (16.1)

355 (14.5)

370 (15.5)

364 (14.7)

Total Duration (ms)

456 (12.8)

434 (13.2)

463 (15.9)

443 (13.3)

Regression Path Duration
(ms)

469 (27.6)

422 (21.1)

467 (25.9)

451 (20.5)

First Pass Regression
Ratio

.165 (.024)

.124 (.022)

.154 (.024)

.152 (.022)

Postcritical Gaze Duration (ms)

339 (15.0)

352 (15.1)

344 (13.7)

348 (16.5)

Total Duration (ms)

432 (15.7)

429 (14.8)

438 (15.1)

411 (14.4)

Regression Path Duration
(ms)

450 (22.2)

460 (20.8)

474 (22.1)

471 (24.7)

First Pass Regression
Ratio

.195 (.027)

.249 (.030)

.269 (.037)

.290 (.036)
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Figure 1. Mean probe recognition times and standard errors for each sentence type at
each noun.
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Figure 2. Mean probe recognition times and standard errors for each sentence type at
each noun in the 0 ms delay condition.
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Figure 3. Mean probe recognition times and standard errors for each sentence type at
each noun in the 500 ms delay condition.
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Figure 4. Mean probe recognition times and standard errors for each sentence type at
each noun in the 1000 ms delay condition.
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Figure 5. Negation effect for each noun at each delay condition in the subject analysis.
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Figure 6. Total duration in the critical region for each position
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Figure 7. Regression path duration in critical region for each position.
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Figure 8. First pass regression ratios in the critical region for negated and non-negated
nouns.

50

Figure 9. First pass regression ratios in the postcritical region for negated and nonnegated nouns.

